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Interested in contractor usage/non-state security assistance? Me too! Check out my past work via the My Research on the tab above, and you're also welcome review the work of my affiliations with the Forum for Private Security Research (FPSR) at King's College London, the International Code of Conduct Association (ICoCA), and the International Stability Operations Association (ISOA). Currently, I'm working to develop a typology of the spectrum of non-state security assistance actors to provide common terminology amongst practitioners and policy makers: |
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The range of non-state actors involved in contingency contracting continues to widen as mercenaries, foreign terrorist fighters, militias, contractors and other non-state actors take on new roles in emerging types of warfare. The terminology used to refer to contractors working in defense and security operations has implications for their legal authority and legitimacy, as well as for the codes of conduct and regulations that guide them. Thus, improving the accurate use of terminology may enhance the efforts that aim to guide and oversee contractor behavior.
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More generally, I maintain this page of resources as a service for our community of practice, so please feel free to send along any resources you think should be added.
Governance
Private Military and Security Companies: Industry-Led Self-Regulatory Initiatives versus State-Led Containment Strategies
Raymond Saner
The increasing privatization of security is a central feature of the way in which the control and oversight of armed force is currently being recalibrated – requiring no less than a comprehensive rethinking of the relationship between the state and the individual citizen. The Working Paper focuses on recent self-regulatory guidelines that have been created by private military and security companies (PMSCs) in order to deter calls for stricter regulations of the industry. This self-imposed quasi-regulatory space counters other international efforts – notably the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct – which seek to strengthen the resolve of states and PMSCs to uphold and respect international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights. This “battle of influence” over the regulation of the use of force, Saner contends, leads to rising tensions between stakeholders who form coalitions consisting of states, PMSCs, and civil society actors on either side of the regulation cleavage. The paper calls for new measures that continue to build on IHL and the Geneva Conventions, but that go beyond the current regulatory positions of existing international initiatives.
The Evolving Contingency Contracting Market: Private Sector Self-Regulation and USG Monitoring of Procurement of Stability Operations Services
Whitney Grespin
U.S. Army War College Press 2016
The activities of private companies in combat operations and complex environments have traditionally drawn minimal attention when compared to their historic presence in such settings yet in the last twenty years the services of these companies have grown to become a seemingly indispensable part of the modern western stabilization arsenal, as well as the subject of much media attention.
Raymond Saner
The increasing privatization of security is a central feature of the way in which the control and oversight of armed force is currently being recalibrated – requiring no less than a comprehensive rethinking of the relationship between the state and the individual citizen. The Working Paper focuses on recent self-regulatory guidelines that have been created by private military and security companies (PMSCs) in order to deter calls for stricter regulations of the industry. This self-imposed quasi-regulatory space counters other international efforts – notably the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct – which seek to strengthen the resolve of states and PMSCs to uphold and respect international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights. This “battle of influence” over the regulation of the use of force, Saner contends, leads to rising tensions between stakeholders who form coalitions consisting of states, PMSCs, and civil society actors on either side of the regulation cleavage. The paper calls for new measures that continue to build on IHL and the Geneva Conventions, but that go beyond the current regulatory positions of existing international initiatives.
The Evolving Contingency Contracting Market: Private Sector Self-Regulation and USG Monitoring of Procurement of Stability Operations Services
Whitney Grespin
U.S. Army War College Press 2016
The activities of private companies in combat operations and complex environments have traditionally drawn minimal attention when compared to their historic presence in such settings yet in the last twenty years the services of these companies have grown to become a seemingly indispensable part of the modern western stabilization arsenal, as well as the subject of much media attention.
AFRICOM AOR
The Wagner Group in Africa: The sham battle of Russian mercenaries against terrorism
Aleksander Olech
Terrorism – Studies, Analyses, Prevention, 2024, no. 5: 273–309
https://doi.org/10.4467/27204383TER.24.010.19398
Abstract: In recent years, the Wagner Group has significantly increased its presence in several African countries. Russian mercenaries have become involved in many conflicts in an effort to expand their influence. One of their main tasks was to fight against terrorism. The analyses carried out, in which the author used qualitative methods and sources relating to the theoretical and practical dimensions of the issue at hand, indicate that the Wagnerists have been posing as their operations in order to maintain military presence on the African continent. Intensifying the Wagner Group's presence is a long-term strategy of the Kremlin, which pursues interests along two tracks-benefiting from cooperation at the state level and engaging mercenaries. Countries of the wider West (members of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union) are also seeking to develop cooperation with African partners. Terrorist organisations also intend to fight for influence on the continent. In this regard, it is necessary to constantly monitor Russia's proactive foreign policy aimed at the rivalry as it affects the presence of Poland and its allies in Africa.
Hired Guns Against Terrorism: Assessing the Use of Commercial Soldiers in Nigeria's Counterterrorism Strategy
Oluwaseyi Mike Bamigboye School of Graduate Studies, Department of International Relations, Isik University, Istanbul, Turkey
September 2023
Abstract: Despite Nigerian military efforts, Boko Haram remains a major threat and the potential role of private security services in combating this threat is largely unknown. Through a qualitative case study, this study fills a critical gap by examining the potential role and impact of private security services and highlighting their effectiveness, commitment to long-term sustainability, and respect for human rights in the fight against Boko Haram. Applied to a broader context, the findings hold significant potential for developing more effective strategies in response to security threats, not only in Nigeria but also in other countries facing similar security challenges
Porous bunker: Private security contractors and the plasticity of Mogadishu’s international ‘green zone’
Jethro Norman
https://doi.org/10.1177/09670106231158890
Abstract: From Baghdad’s ‘Emerald City’ to Kabul’s ‘Kabubble’, international green zones have been characterized as ‘bunkerized’ and temporary. Despite efforts to make these spaces appear sealed, they are more porous than we assume. Drawing on fieldwork in Mogadishu and research with private security contractors, this article reconceptualizes international enclaves in terms of their inherent plasticity, moulded by the mobilities, intentions and bureaucracies of those within. The article illustrates the heterogenous sociospatial relations within Mogadishu’s green zone, arguing that it is sustained through internal frictions and transgressive spatial practices that are not captured by the bunkerization motif. The limits of bunkerization are revealed most starkly through the work of security contractors who enjoy greater mobility and access to information than many of the green zone’s transient international workers. They assume the gatekeeper role, sustaining conditions of manageable insecurity by ordering the messy sociopolitical space of the city into bounded zones. Beyond the façade of the enclave, however, their mobility is reliant on ‘local’ Somali partners navigating the complexities of Mogadishu on their behalf. As an interface between the secure inside and the dangerous outside, some contractors have emerged as opportunistic power-brokers connecting Somali entrepreneurs on the outside to the resources within.
Private military companies and combating terrorism in Mozambique
Klaudia Badzyńska
APRIL 16, 2021
Summary: Mozambique has been facing the attacks from jihadists for many years. In 2018, an Islamist extremist group, Ansar al-Sunna, started a campaign of violence against the governmental and civilian targets in Cabo Delgado, the northern province of Mozambique. Muslims form 54% of its citizens[1], while the majority of Mozambique inhabitants are Christians. The group started its activity around 2017 as a religious organization, and only later it became militarized. Its first members were supporters of Aboud Rogo Mohammed, a radical Kenyan priest, who was shot in 2012. After this incident, Ansar al-Sunna has been moving into the territory of Mozambique. Although the rebels are also referred to as Al-Shabaab, they have nothing in common with a terrorist organization from Somalia with the same name.
Turning the tides of war: The impact of private military and security companies on Nigeria’s counterinsurgency against Boko Haram
Caroline Varin
Pages 144-157 | Published online: 20 Jul 2018
Abstract: Since the 2003 war in Iraq, private military and security companies (PMSCs) have become increasingly legitimate actors in modern conflicts. Despite this normative shift, rumours in March 2015 regarding the use of South African mercenaries in Nigeria to combat Boko Haram insurgents caused an international outrage, while the Nigerian government remained nonchalantly silent on the matter. This article investigates the impact of mercenaries on the conflict in the last six months of the Jonathan government. Using primary and secondary qualitative research, it assesses the role that PMSCs played in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency strategy, along with the ensuing reaction of international and local media to the outsourcing of violence to foreign companies. The article concludes that – notwithstanding the improved image of PMSCs in the world, and the actual impact of the contractors on the Nigerian counterinsurgency effort – the stigma of mercenaries continues to plague the industry, particularly on the African continent.
Reassessing private military and security company (PMSC) ‘competition‘ in civil war: lessons from Sierra Leone
Christopher M. Faulkner,Joshua E. Lambert, Jonathan M. Powell
Pages 641-659 | Published online: 13 Jun 2019
ABSTRACT This paper challenges recent claims that competitive market dynamics incentivize Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) to fully commit to providing effective services, thereby reducing the duration of civil war. Our assessment of a most-likely case scenario for this argument – Sierra Leone – reveals four critical problems. First, there is rarely direct competition, even if numerous companies are present. Second, the presence of multiple PMSCs usually represents a collaboration among subsidiaries providing distinct services, often under the same corporate umbrella. Third, data aggregation obfuscates the overlap of PMSC presence, inflating the amount of perceived competition. Finally, we raise concerns regarding how quantitative analyses can conflate conflict intensity with conflict termination.
Aleksander Olech
Terrorism – Studies, Analyses, Prevention, 2024, no. 5: 273–309
https://doi.org/10.4467/27204383TER.24.010.19398
Abstract: In recent years, the Wagner Group has significantly increased its presence in several African countries. Russian mercenaries have become involved in many conflicts in an effort to expand their influence. One of their main tasks was to fight against terrorism. The analyses carried out, in which the author used qualitative methods and sources relating to the theoretical and practical dimensions of the issue at hand, indicate that the Wagnerists have been posing as their operations in order to maintain military presence on the African continent. Intensifying the Wagner Group's presence is a long-term strategy of the Kremlin, which pursues interests along two tracks-benefiting from cooperation at the state level and engaging mercenaries. Countries of the wider West (members of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union) are also seeking to develop cooperation with African partners. Terrorist organisations also intend to fight for influence on the continent. In this regard, it is necessary to constantly monitor Russia's proactive foreign policy aimed at the rivalry as it affects the presence of Poland and its allies in Africa.
Hired Guns Against Terrorism: Assessing the Use of Commercial Soldiers in Nigeria's Counterterrorism Strategy
Oluwaseyi Mike Bamigboye School of Graduate Studies, Department of International Relations, Isik University, Istanbul, Turkey
September 2023
Abstract: Despite Nigerian military efforts, Boko Haram remains a major threat and the potential role of private security services in combating this threat is largely unknown. Through a qualitative case study, this study fills a critical gap by examining the potential role and impact of private security services and highlighting their effectiveness, commitment to long-term sustainability, and respect for human rights in the fight against Boko Haram. Applied to a broader context, the findings hold significant potential for developing more effective strategies in response to security threats, not only in Nigeria but also in other countries facing similar security challenges
Porous bunker: Private security contractors and the plasticity of Mogadishu’s international ‘green zone’
Jethro Norman
https://doi.org/10.1177/09670106231158890
Abstract: From Baghdad’s ‘Emerald City’ to Kabul’s ‘Kabubble’, international green zones have been characterized as ‘bunkerized’ and temporary. Despite efforts to make these spaces appear sealed, they are more porous than we assume. Drawing on fieldwork in Mogadishu and research with private security contractors, this article reconceptualizes international enclaves in terms of their inherent plasticity, moulded by the mobilities, intentions and bureaucracies of those within. The article illustrates the heterogenous sociospatial relations within Mogadishu’s green zone, arguing that it is sustained through internal frictions and transgressive spatial practices that are not captured by the bunkerization motif. The limits of bunkerization are revealed most starkly through the work of security contractors who enjoy greater mobility and access to information than many of the green zone’s transient international workers. They assume the gatekeeper role, sustaining conditions of manageable insecurity by ordering the messy sociopolitical space of the city into bounded zones. Beyond the façade of the enclave, however, their mobility is reliant on ‘local’ Somali partners navigating the complexities of Mogadishu on their behalf. As an interface between the secure inside and the dangerous outside, some contractors have emerged as opportunistic power-brokers connecting Somali entrepreneurs on the outside to the resources within.
Private military companies and combating terrorism in Mozambique
Klaudia Badzyńska
APRIL 16, 2021
Summary: Mozambique has been facing the attacks from jihadists for many years. In 2018, an Islamist extremist group, Ansar al-Sunna, started a campaign of violence against the governmental and civilian targets in Cabo Delgado, the northern province of Mozambique. Muslims form 54% of its citizens[1], while the majority of Mozambique inhabitants are Christians. The group started its activity around 2017 as a religious organization, and only later it became militarized. Its first members were supporters of Aboud Rogo Mohammed, a radical Kenyan priest, who was shot in 2012. After this incident, Ansar al-Sunna has been moving into the territory of Mozambique. Although the rebels are also referred to as Al-Shabaab, they have nothing in common with a terrorist organization from Somalia with the same name.
Turning the tides of war: The impact of private military and security companies on Nigeria’s counterinsurgency against Boko Haram
Caroline Varin
Pages 144-157 | Published online: 20 Jul 2018
Abstract: Since the 2003 war in Iraq, private military and security companies (PMSCs) have become increasingly legitimate actors in modern conflicts. Despite this normative shift, rumours in March 2015 regarding the use of South African mercenaries in Nigeria to combat Boko Haram insurgents caused an international outrage, while the Nigerian government remained nonchalantly silent on the matter. This article investigates the impact of mercenaries on the conflict in the last six months of the Jonathan government. Using primary and secondary qualitative research, it assesses the role that PMSCs played in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency strategy, along with the ensuing reaction of international and local media to the outsourcing of violence to foreign companies. The article concludes that – notwithstanding the improved image of PMSCs in the world, and the actual impact of the contractors on the Nigerian counterinsurgency effort – the stigma of mercenaries continues to plague the industry, particularly on the African continent.
Reassessing private military and security company (PMSC) ‘competition‘ in civil war: lessons from Sierra Leone
Christopher M. Faulkner,Joshua E. Lambert, Jonathan M. Powell
Pages 641-659 | Published online: 13 Jun 2019
ABSTRACT This paper challenges recent claims that competitive market dynamics incentivize Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) to fully commit to providing effective services, thereby reducing the duration of civil war. Our assessment of a most-likely case scenario for this argument – Sierra Leone – reveals four critical problems. First, there is rarely direct competition, even if numerous companies are present. Second, the presence of multiple PMSCs usually represents a collaboration among subsidiaries providing distinct services, often under the same corporate umbrella. Third, data aggregation obfuscates the overlap of PMSC presence, inflating the amount of perceived competition. Finally, we raise concerns regarding how quantitative analyses can conflate conflict intensity with conflict termination.
Historical Perspectives
Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs), Military Effectiveness, and Conflict Severity in Weak States, 1990–2007
Ulrich Petersohn 2015
Abstract: For more than two decades, private military and security companies (PMSCs) have become increasingly involved in armed conflicts. A common view is that PMSCs are menaces who simply take economic advantage of—and thereby aggravate—already bad situations. Yet, empirical research has rarely investigated these claims or the impact of commercial actors’ selling force-related services. This article investigates how PMSCs impact the severity of armed conflict in weak states and advances the argument that PMSC services increase the client’s military effectiveness. In turn, increased military effectiveness translates into increased conflict severity, the extent of which depends on type of service provided by the PMSC, the level of competition on the market, and oversight.
Private Military and Security Companies as a Legacy of War: Lessons Learned From the Former Yugoslavia
Jelena Aparac
Researcher, Former member, Chair Rapporteur of the United Nations Working Group on the use of Mercenaries
Abstract: The war in the former Yugoslavia produced many highly trained and experienced combatants, some of whom engaged not only in a variety of organized criminal activities such as the illicit trade of natural resources, trafficking and corruption, but also war crimes. In the post-war environment various criminal groups took advantage of post-conflict transition conditions which enabled them to be transformed into legitimate legal entities. The failure to investigate and hold to account those involved in criminal activity meant that demobilized soldiers turned to highly profitable, legally constituted private military and security companies (PMSCs). This is coupled with poorly designed security sector reforms that often fail to enhance effective and accountable security that is respectful of human rights. In recent years, similar transformations of many former combatants and criminal groups into legitimate PMSCs around the globe have raised new concerns about their growing activities across different sectors. This article uses the former Yugoslavia as an example from which to highlight some of the increasingly common problems posed by the creation of private military and security providers globally, as a result of the current uncoordinated processes to prevent armed conflicts. The article reflects on the need to avoid smart sanctions and use other foreign policy tools, while calling for an integrated approach to security sector reform and transitional justice that is necessary for sustainable peace.
Ulrich Petersohn 2015
Abstract: For more than two decades, private military and security companies (PMSCs) have become increasingly involved in armed conflicts. A common view is that PMSCs are menaces who simply take economic advantage of—and thereby aggravate—already bad situations. Yet, empirical research has rarely investigated these claims or the impact of commercial actors’ selling force-related services. This article investigates how PMSCs impact the severity of armed conflict in weak states and advances the argument that PMSC services increase the client’s military effectiveness. In turn, increased military effectiveness translates into increased conflict severity, the extent of which depends on type of service provided by the PMSC, the level of competition on the market, and oversight.
Private Military and Security Companies as a Legacy of War: Lessons Learned From the Former Yugoslavia
Jelena Aparac
Researcher, Former member, Chair Rapporteur of the United Nations Working Group on the use of Mercenaries
Abstract: The war in the former Yugoslavia produced many highly trained and experienced combatants, some of whom engaged not only in a variety of organized criminal activities such as the illicit trade of natural resources, trafficking and corruption, but also war crimes. In the post-war environment various criminal groups took advantage of post-conflict transition conditions which enabled them to be transformed into legitimate legal entities. The failure to investigate and hold to account those involved in criminal activity meant that demobilized soldiers turned to highly profitable, legally constituted private military and security companies (PMSCs). This is coupled with poorly designed security sector reforms that often fail to enhance effective and accountable security that is respectful of human rights. In recent years, similar transformations of many former combatants and criminal groups into legitimate PMSCs around the globe have raised new concerns about their growing activities across different sectors. This article uses the former Yugoslavia as an example from which to highlight some of the increasingly common problems posed by the creation of private military and security providers globally, as a result of the current uncoordinated processes to prevent armed conflicts. The article reflects on the need to avoid smart sanctions and use other foreign policy tools, while calling for an integrated approach to security sector reform and transitional justice that is necessary for sustainable peace.